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GOVERNANCE BY AGREEMENTS: WHY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
ENTER INTO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS?

Abstract
While much can be learned about the roles of interjurisdictional agreements between two
jurisdictions, little is known about the range and scope of multilateral agreements
(MLAs) in the provision of collective goods. Based on the theory of institutional
collective action, this article explores two characteristics of agreements: restrictive and
adaptive, and seeks to understand why local governments enter into one arrangement and
not the other. This article argues that the local government decisions to enter into MLAs
are influenced by the characteristics of goods and services, the nature of
interjurisdictional relations, the geographic configuration of governments, and the
number of signatories involved. An analysis of public safety activities in Florida provides
support for these propositions.

Keywords: interjurisdictional agreements, mutual aid agreement, public safety,
emergency management, institutional collective action.
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GOVERNANCE BY AGREEMENTS: WHY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
ENTER INTO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS?

Recently, there has been a tremendous interest in formal agreements in area of emergency
management (Lynn 2005; Kettl 2007; Nicholson 2007). While formal agreements
between two jurisdictions are relatively common, agreements with multiple parties are
much less so. When they do exist, they tend to establish functionally organized coalitions
of specialized agencies for finite periods of time---which Friesema (1970) referred to as
multilateral agreements (MLAs). Are multilateral agreements undersupplied? One reason
to suspect they are is that, regardless of the collective benefit they provide, MLAs are
difficult and costly for local actors to create since the transaction costs are generally
higher than bilateral agreements. For example, local governments participating in
multilateral mutual aid agreements may subject themselves to tort immunity or workers
compensation issues (Reynolds 2003; Nicholson 2007). Local governments may also find
themselves “locked-in” or lose freedom of unilateral action upon entering into an MLA
(Sonenblum et al 1977; Hirlinger & Morgan 1991).
MLAs represent special contractual dilemmas. The costs of organizing tasks and
monitoring the signatories’ behaviors increase with the number of participants.
Agreements that involve multiple specialized agencies, such as joint planning
agreements, often involve political bargaining. Indeed, effective preparedness and
detailed mitigation programs demand the willingness and capacity of multiple agencies to
plan, regulate, and enforce local land-use and building codes (Waugh 1994). Even though
agreements among similar agencies may represent homogenous policy goals and
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preferences, potential conflicts over administrative boundaries and loss of autonomy can
occur, posing barriers to MLAs.
The identification of MLAs in previous studies implies they are not ad hoc or
piecemeal arrangements for regional integration. Rather, MLAs provide an important
piece in the governance puzzle. Local governments tend to establish a variety of
contractual arrangements to accommodate preferences and accomplish specific tasks such
as interlocal services agreements, mutual aid agreements, joint planning agreements, and
memoranda of understanding (Atkins 1997; Nunn & Rosentraub 1997; FLCIR 2001).
However, key questions remain: why do local governments enter into a particular type of
agreement and not the other; and why do they choose MLAs, even though they could free
ride on the efforts of others?
One hypothesis focuses on mechanisms used to control the behavior of
signatories. Adaptive arrangements, for example, provide broad discretion and flexibility
for future circumstances; restrictive arrangements, on the other hand, provide procedural
characteristics, authority, and outcome requirements that are clearly stated in advance to
ensure that parties fulfill the terms of their contracts. Neither mechanism, however, is free
from the transaction costs of contracting. Thus, local governments choose the one with
the least costs in order to govern their transactions.
This study departs from prior work on survey-based perceptions of formal
agreements by differentiating different types of MLAs (Friesema 1970, 1971; McDavid
1977; Smith 1979; ACIR 1985; Hirlinger & Morgan 1991; Foster 1998; Thurmaier &
Wood 2002). The analysis examines the structure and characteristics of all MLAs
reported by Florida’s major county and municipal governments. Specifically, it analyses
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the contents of MLAs, which include information on the type of agreements, the
activities carried out by the government units, the number of signatories, the functional
unit that provides the services, and the status of the agreements.
This study focuses on MLAs in Florida in activities of public safety---fire, police,
and emergency medical services (EMS). Studying MLAs for specific categories of
services in a single state has its limitations, but there are also advantages. It allows us to
control for statutory variation across states and provides an opportunity to study the
choice of agreements in-depth. Florida is one of the most progressive states in
encouraging interlocal coordination through formal agreements, and given its
geographical location, most local governments---acting as first-line responders---allocate
substantive budgetary amounts for public safety activities in order to respond to major
disasters (such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding) and routine law enforcement
activities (such as drug trafficking, traffic patrol, and law enforcement). Although the
advantages of MLAs can be realized when local governments agree to work together,
they are often strained by past conflicts and rivalries, making public safety a worthwhile
activity to study (Ostrom & Whitaker 1973; Ostrom et al 1973; McDavid 1977; Carr &
LeRoux 2005).
The following section lays out the theoretical arguments linking transaction costs
to local government choices about MLAs. The second section explores explanations for
local government decisions based on the institutional collective action framework. The
third section identifies the methods, data on MLAs in Florida, and the characteristics of
goods and services related to public safety activities. The fourth section reports the
findings. The conclusion identifies future research needs for MLAs.

5

STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
Why do local governments enter into MLAs? The conventional answer is that a
MLA is a consequence of joint benefits that can be anticipated by negotiating parties.
Transaction costs theory complicates this answer by asserting that uncertainties impose
costs on intergovernmental relations. Absent foresight, local governments cannot agree
on a substantive response to uncertainty, so in order to minimize costs of planning,
adapting, and monitoring task completion across jurisdictions, binding contracts are
crafted as a procedural safeguard to reduce uncertainty (Gillette 2001; Brown & Potoski
2003; Feiock 2004; 2007). Collective action theory posits that uncertainties impose costs
on interjurisdictional agreements. Various arrangements sanctioned by the state provide
alternative mechanisms for managing uncertainty according to their available capital and
human resource endowments. However, these alternative arrangements also impose
different costs on local governments’ relationships. Thus, local governments enter into
an agreement in a bounded rational fashion by selecting an arrangement to achieve task
completion that simultaneously minimizes the transaction costs of contracting.
A variant of transaction costs theory argues that decisions to enter into agreements
depend upon the structural arrangements established by the agreements. For example,
mutual aid/operational assistance agreements can be used as legal documents to establish
organization, typically by function, in order to coordinate activities of various local
entities. Administrative bodies such as bomb squads or regional task forces have strong
functionally organized bureaucracies to ensure stability and decisiveness (Lynn 2005;
Kettl 2007). Public officials seeking stability through organizational structure can opt for
legally binding agreements to safeguard their property rights such as specialized
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equipment, protection against tort liability, and reimbursement of actual costs when
performing mutual assistance.
The theoretical and empirical basis for the transaction costs argument remains
underdeveloped. Theoretically, there are variations in the types of agreements available
to local governments (Miller 1981; ACIR 1985; Atkins 1997; Nunn & Rosentraub 1997;
FLCIR 2001). An informal agreement leaves local governments less secure in their rights
to adjudication during a dispute, but such an arrangement is relatively easy to modify
should unforeseen circumstances arise. Memoranda of understanding and/or memoranda
of agreement can greatly reduce the transaction costs of writing and implementing an
agreement compared to interlocal service agreements, but they are nonobligatory,
reciprocal, and yet easily terminated without significant legal consequences. Mutual aid
or operational assistance agreements, on the other hand, are only operative “when certain
conditions come into existence and they remain in operation only so long as these
conditions are present.” (Bollens & Schmandt 1965: 77)
The methodologies of empirical studies on MLAs have not advanced much
beyond the surveys on interjurisdictional agreements conducted in the 1970s. The
difficulty lies mostly in how to identify the different kind of agreements. Several studies
count the number of bilateral agreements by service categories (Friesema 1970, 1971;
Thurmaier & Chen 2005); developing survey instruments to determine the extent of
utilization of agreements (ACIR 1985; Hirlinger & Morgan 1991; Carr & LeRoux 2005);
and conducting interviews and surveys to determine the attitudes of local officials toward
such agreements (Smith 1979; Foster 1998). Consequently, most agreements are
classified as a single arrangement and thus fail to provide insight on how different types
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of agreements produce different incentive structures for local governments to form
alliances (Feiock 2004; 2007).

Adaptive and Restrictive MLAs
The range of MLAs can be characterized as adaptive or restrictive. An agreement
is “restrictive” if it can protect local governments’ property rights through a set of clearly
specified rules. Safeguards depend on the extent to which parties can come to a
consensus on the effectiveness of an agreement governing their transactions. To be
effective, the arrangement must be backed by specific state statutes or legally and
economically defensible local ordinances. The specific services to be rendered and the
organizational structure established are predictable and can be included in the agreement.
The legal regime that induces the desired cooperative behavior is the one that enforces
the promises to the letter. Stability and decisiveness can be promoted because the set of
working rules that determines specific outcomes produces stability for all parties
involved in the arrangement. This is particularly important because, unless the agreement
is very specific, the passage of time and turnover of local decision-makers can erode and
obscure the original basis of the agreement (FLCIR 2001). Examples of restrictive
arrangements include legally binding contracts such as interlocal service agreements,
contracts, or lease agreements. A restrictive arrangement may also include a hybrid
mutual aid/operational assistance agreement.
On the other hand, the existence of adaptive arrangements such as mutual aid
agreements, memos of understanding, letter of agreements, or informal agreements can
also provide alternative mechanisms to secure coordination. One of the advantages of an
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adaptive arrangement is that it specifies the activities to be rendered without
unnecessarily intruding on the authority of other jurisdictions. Sclar (2000), for example,
considered a flexible contract to be an arrangement established by parties in complex
settings leaving the details to be filled in later. This arrangement produces a flexible
organizational structure in order to provide general guidelines for locally-coordinated
efforts. They are purposely designed to complement pre-existing policies as opposed to a
nearly crafted joint vision to improve the overall welfare of the participating local
governments’ constituents. However, the extent to which they have been used to secure
coordination is still an open question.
These broad characteristics are consistent with the transaction costs approach in
the sense that the working rules embedded in a range of interlocal agreements can be
identified and aggregated, and then compared based upon their characteristics. Depending
upon the authority granted by state statutes, the restrictive and adaptive arrangements
would allow us to define the scope, stringency of requirements, and the degree to which
local governments can enforce their claim if signatories default and therefore, permit us
to predict how local governments will behave given the uncertainty of their transactions.
Moreover, we are most interested in determining not only the general pattern in which
different factors can affect local government’s contractual choice, but also the context in
which the arrangements are formed.

DETERMINANTS OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
The decision to enter a restrictive or adaptive agreement presents a challenging
institutional design problem because local actors must overcome collective action as well
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as transaction cost problems. The institutional collective action perspective suggests that
institutional design results from efforts to minimize the costs of developing and
maintaining contractual arrangements (Scholz & Feiock 2007). Local officials
participating in MLAs may be concerned whether assistance can be provided in a timely
and equitable manner to their constituency if others request similar aid. Crafting a legally
binding contract is also an option, but it is almost impossible for localities to assign
monetary values or specify detailed reciprocal emergency aid and assistance before
disasters occur. Although it is difficult to imagine an instance in which a jurisdiction in
critical need of assistance would not receive it from neighboring governments, the
decision not to provide assistance is also a strategic act available to avoid legal liability
and financial costs. We argue that the transaction costs associated with MLAs are further
exacerbated by the problems of institutional collective action.
Institutional collective action problems occur when the transaction costs of
organizing tasks and monitoring the behaviors of signatories increase with uncertainties.
The problem gets complicated when an agreement involving multiple agencies requires
political bargaining and compromises. It is uncertain whether signatories would claim
fiscal hardship or avoid implementation of an agreed set of plans by deliberately
underestimating their capacities to meet standards of mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery activities. Consequently, localities with the most resources may have to
compensate for their shortcomings. If a significant number of signatories adopt this
pattern of behavior, the rewards produced by MLAs will be suboptimal. Although group
pressure can minimize the dilemma, the costs of communicating with other parties and
reaching a joint decision are generally high, especially when the number of signatories
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increases. Because of these dilemmas, some localities would prefer to have a legally
binding contract or a restrictive arrangement to minimize the risk of opportunism.
Building from the ICA framework, the following sections identify four factors that shape
the transaction costs of contracting: the nature of goods and services, the number of
signatories involved, interjurisdictional relations, and the geographic configuration of
governments.
Characteristics of goods and services: While some activities may require local
governments to work collaboratively with different specialized agencies to get the job
done, local officials must customize their arrangements according to the nature of goods
and services (Ferris & Graddy 1986; Post 2004; Stein 1990; Brown & Potoski 2003). For
goods and services with high sunk costs and outcomes difficult to specify in advance, the
transaction costs are especially high, especially if the arrangements are based on
restrictive arrangements. However, when coupled with uncertainty that future
circumstances may change, local governments could find themselves trapped by the
agreed set of rules, leading to a joint-decision trap (Baird 1990; Gillette 1990; Scharpf
1998). As an alternative, an adaptive arrangement can be crafted in order to avoid future
disputes. This type of arrangement is preferred because signatories can behave flexibly
according to changed circumstances.
In public safety, MLAs have been used by local governments to cope with routine
and non-routine emergency activities. For example, activities of law enforcement
agencies are highly diverse ranging from recurring and routine public safety services
(such as standard police patrol, educational programs, enforcement of sanitation and
licensing regulations, control of crowds) to civilian defense and disaster duties during
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episodic events (such as evacuations planning, mutual aid responses, and recovery
efforts). While some routine activities can be shared or provided by other jurisdictions
through legal arrangements, episodic activities require the combined efforts of disparate
agencies across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries.
Restrictive arrangements are most important for local governments in two types
of transactions: (1) when local government makes a permanent transfer of total
responsibility for the provision of a service to another governmental unit such as
functional consolidation (ACIR 1985; Atkins 1997; FLCIR 2001); and (2) when
transactions involve some forms of exchange of payments, revenue sharing, or impact
fees. In addition to issues related to delegation of power and financial transfers, local
governments may enter into restrictive arrangements in order to protect themselves from
inherent risks associated with highly asset specific transactions (Brown & Potoski 2003;
1985). The arrangements for these transactions, as authorized by a state statutory
framework, are legally binding.
On the other hand, when services involve knowledge-based specificity, local
governments would prefer to enter into adaptive arrangements. Examples include
standardized procedures, planning and mitigation strategies, technical reports etc.
Specifying the exact processes and outcomes in advance for such services creates
difficulties in the sense that they are costly to enforce in a legal system and economically
costly to monitor. In addition, measurement problems hinder monitoring and effective
enforcement because they require quantitative measures of what counts as an appropriate
level of activity by a service provider, or the extent to which the services achieve their
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desired impacts (Brown & Potoski 1985). In this circumstance, a more adaptive
arrangement will be established to govern their transactions.
Number of signatories: The number of signatories in an agreement is also salient
to local institutional design decisions. But, the effects of group size on contractual choice
are ambiguous (Pisano 1989; Gulati 1995; Gulati & Singh 1998). On one hand, the larger
the number of signatories, the greater the possibility that labor and specialization will be
divided, resulting in an increased likelihood that local governments will cooperate and
benefit from the agreement. On the other hand, the larger the number of potential
collaborators, the greater the difficulty of communication among the members and the
less stable the interlocal cooperation. Pisano (1980) observes that the larger the number
of partners involved in an agreement, it is more likely that an alliance will be based on
relational contracting. Gulati (1995) and Gulati and Singh (1998) conclude that this
variable has no statistically significant impact on the choice of governance form. By
contrast, Oxley (1997) found a larger scope of partners has a significant and positive
effect on the probability of relational contracting.
The number of signatories dictates the relative distributional gains and
organizational costs. For instance, the smaller the group, the easier it is to establish a
restrictive arrangement because there are fewer problems determining how benefits will
be distributed. The monitoring costs will also be lower and thus, signatories will be less
likely to act opportunistically. A large number of signatories will decrease the relative
benefits to individual participants; it will lead to greater organization costs and thus, there
is a tendency for signatories to free ride on the efforts of others. The transaction costs are
higher as the number of signatories increases. For example, a qualitative study conducted
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in Iowa by Irene Rubin (2004) reports evidence that local governments entering into an
MLA require a level of ongoing participation to keep the service going and solve
problems. The need for ongoing participation creates some informal limits to how many
MLAs can be entered into by localities. So, we would expect a larger number of
signatories would lead local governments to enter into an adaptive arrangement.
Intergovernmental relations: Conventional wisdom suggests that localities are
highly competitive and face obstacles to divide bargaining surpluses from cooperative
efforts. Although they share similar concerns, their attempts to improve conditions are
impeded by strategic acts to capture the greater share of the surplus (who should get the
credit). Hence, contractual arrangements between municipal governments are likely to be
based on a clear set of working rules in order to secure a distributive surplus. On the other
hand, local governments may work collaboratively through adaptive arrangements.
Although their pre-existing relations may be strained by past conflicts and rivalries, they
need not enter into a restrictive arrangement. They can take advantage of redundancy in
local emergency responses, resources and personnel through adaptive arrangements
covering a large and multi-jurisdictional boundary. The higher the number of
municipalities located within a county, the more likely an adaptive MLA will be
employed to avoid future disputes.
Intergovernmental relations can also be captured by agreements involving
specialized provision units such as police, EMS, and fire services. For example, an
agreement that involves two or three specialized agencies is not uncommon in Florida.
There has been a gradual increase in the trend of local governments merging or
consolidating their EMS with other functional areas such as fire or police in order to reap
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the economies of scope and scale. But, under certain conditions, this need not be the case.
When an agreement affects the administrative boundary of a provisional unit, parties to
the agreement might incur high transaction costs in negotiating, operating, and enforcing
their multiple preferences. We expect an MLA with restrictive arrangements will be
preferred over operating and enforcing the provision of a service in order to avoid future
disputes.
On the other hand, an MLA---established by similar functional agencies--represents homogeneity of policy goals and preferences. Having similar concerns and
policy goals can reduce the transaction costs of negotiating an agreement, and thus should
motivate specialized agencies to choose an adaptive arrangement as opposed to an
agreement involving multiple specialized agencies. For example, McDavid’s (1977)
study of 26 independent police departments in St. Louis County found unwritten mutual
aid agreements and information agreements have positive impact on police performance
suggesting smaller jurisdictions have the capacity to develop informal networks of
intergovernmental relations to facilitate the delivery of services in multiple-jurisdictional
settings. This conclusion is similar to other empirical studies on police performance
(Ostrom & Whitaker 1973; Ostrom et al 1973).
Geographic location and number of jurisdictions: Localities that are prone to
natural disasters and evacuation concerns are more likely to enter into adaptive
arrangements rather than restrictive arrangements in order to take advantage of
redundancy in local emergency response. Geographic location reflects local preferences
i.e., as expressed through residents particular cultural and social styles of living. For
example, residents living along the coastlines---defined by their social and economic

15

status---tend to have homogenous preferences and are likely to have higher expectations
of their local officials on public safety activities. Because demographic homogeneity
reduces agency costs for officials negotiating interlocal agreements on behalf of citizens,
we can expect intra-jurisdictional homogeneity will increase the likelihood of MLAs. The
nature of such arrangement is still an open question, however.
Feiock (2007) has suggested that fixed geographic border creates
interdependencies. Governments with common borders are not stuck in a one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma; the impossibility of exit means defection from cooperation exposes
the defector to retaliation. The prospect of future play with the same party constrains
opportunism such that it is in the interest of each government to cooperate with neighbors
who cooperate. This suggests the tendency for local governments to enter into a mutual
aid or memoranda of agreement since it would be sufficient to curb opportunistic
behaviors through informal sanction. The higher the number of jurisdictions within a
political boundary, the more likely they would enter into adaptive arrangement if such
arrangement can provide opportunities for mutual assurances that each government will
contribute to the provision of the collective good.
However, the higher the number of municipalities located within a county’s
political boundary, the more likely their relationships could be strained by rivalries and
past conflicts and thus, the more likely a restrictive MLA will be employed to avoid
future disputes. Moreover, if local officials are still concerned whether assistance can be
provided in a timely and equitable manner, the likelihood of agreements with the state or
other jurisdictions independently will be very high.
We also control for vulnerabilities of localities given their proximity to the
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coastlines. This variable captures local government decisions when there is a need to
become more resilient to natural disasters i.e., by establishing MLAs (Comfort 2006).

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
Identifying Multilateral Agreements
To gain a better sense of MLAs used by local governments, consider a combined
mutual aid/operational assistance agreement in the realm of public safety in Florida. The
agreement is aimed to coordinate multiple-jurisdiction activities in an event requiring an
emergency response to bomb threats, explosives, hazardous devices, and weapons of
mass destruction in the Florida Big Bend region. Under the Big Bend Bomb Squad
agreement authorized by Section 23.12, Fla. Stat., the core group is a frontline taskforce
consisting of four law enforcement agencies in Leon County 1 . As the producer of this
service, the taskforce’s responsibility remains in Leon County at all times and may
provide first line response to the other 12 counties in the Big Bend region only upon
request.
Take another example. A group of seven counties, nine municipal governments,
and one independent special district in Central Florida recently entered into a “Permitting
Mutual Aid Agreement” under which the actors agreed to establish administrative and
standard procedures to be used when responding to non-routine emergency activities. An
outcome of the agreement takes the form of a non-hierarchical structure. There is no
central actor to coordinate the activities of members but the agreement carries broad
associational and practical benefits. For instance, even though the agreement, as
1

The taskforce consists of personnel from the State of Florida Division of Fire Marshals,
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (Division of Capitol Police), Leon County Sheriff's
Office, and Tallahassee Police Department.
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sanctioned by Florida’s Mutual Aid Act, grants the assisting personnel the same powers,
duties, rights, privileges and immunities they command in their own jurisdiction, the
assisting party, acting on its sole discretion, can still withdraw assistance at any time.
These examples illustrate the different structural outcomes produced by MLAs.
The arrangements define the scope, stringency of requirements, and the degree to which
local governments can enforce their claim if signatories default, and thus may be used
strategically by local government to span administrative and political boundaries. In order
to differentiate these possibilities, we identify the different types of MLAs in Florida
utilizing the data from various Interlocal Service Delivery Reports (hereafter the Report).
The information is compiled by the Florida Department of Community Affairs 2 . The
Report contains information on the types of agreements and the activities carried out by
local governments from 1973 to 2003. The Report also includes the number of signatories
in an agreement, the functional unit that provides the services, and the status of an
agreement.
In order to systematically identify the MLAs from the Report, we tried to ensure
that the arrangements listed were in accordance with statutory definitions. For example,
the Interlocal Cooperation Act of 1969 (s. 163.01, Fla. Stat.) provides a broad legal
framework for local governments to enter into agreements with either the public or
private sector; the Florida Mutual Aid Act authorizes local and state law enforcement
agencies to enter into mutual aid or operational assistance agreement; and Florida’s
Growth Management Act, which has “had a significant impact” on encouraging

2

Under Chapter 2002-296, Law of Florida, added sections 163.3177(6) (h) 6, 7, and 8, Fla.
Sta., all counties in Florida with greater than 100,000 population and their municipalities and
special districts were required to prepare and submit the Report to Florida Department of
Community Affairs.
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intergovernmental coordination through the use of joint planning agreements (FLCIR
2001). Although most localities generally made implicit reports on the types of
agreements governing their transactions, others did not. To overcome this problem, we
relied on the substantive titles of reported agreements and matched them against the
statutory framework that authorized their usage to gain insight into the structural
arrangements established by local governments.
The Report highlights an array of agreements ranging from interlocal service
agreements to contract and lease agreements, from mutual aid agreements to memoranda
of understanding, to joint planning agreement and letters of agreement (Table 1). To
capture the different arrangements, whether they are authorized by the state statutes or
not, MLAs are classified into two general forms: restrictive and adaptive. The adaptive
arrangement includes mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, and letters of
agreement. The restrictive arrangements include interlocal service agreements, joint
planning agreements, contracts, lease agreements, or a hybrid arrangement that
establishes a single or two-tier hierarchical structure such as the Permitting Mutual Aid
Agreement in Central Florida and the Big Bend Region’s Bomb Squad Mutual
Aid/Operational Assistance agreement respectively. We identified 390 MLAs in Florida’s
32 largest counties.

[Table 1 about here]

Identifying Characteristics of Goods and Services
To test the proposition that characteristics of goods and services have an effect on
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contractual choice, services are classified by their asset specificity and measurement
difficulty. The approach is an extension of Williamson’s transaction costs theory (1975),
which defines asset specificity as the extent to which a specialized investment needed for
the production of one service can also be used for the production of another; service
measurability refers to the relative difficulty in measuring and monitoring the outcomes
of the services. However, general service classifications such as that of Brown and
Potoski (2003) are problematic because, they do not focus on specific functions, account
for contracting with governments rather than the private vendors, or take into account
non-routine public safety activities i.e., “Mutual Aid Assistance/Disaster Relief,”
“Planning/Standard Procedure,” and “Joint Studies/Technical Assistance.”
Following Brown and Potoski’s procedures, we first identifying the categories of
goods and services and then conducting a survey of independent experts in emergency
management and practitioners (n=18). That is, we identified and developed a list of goods
and services based on previous empirical studies in the realm of public safety and
matched the list against goods and service involved in our agreements. We then
characterized each category by a two-by-two transaction costs matrix based on a mean
rating (i.e., asset specificity mean=3.43; service measurability mean = 2.77). Those
categories that fall below the mean are characterized as having low asset specificity or
service measurability; those above the mean are characterized as having high asset
specificity or service measurability. While high on both asset specificity and service
measurability problems reflects the importance of a trust-based relationship among
signatories, low on both characteristics suggests the relative ease by which units of
governments can enter into binding contracts (Brown & Potoski 2005). Fourteen public
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safety service categories are identified. Table 2 summarizes their characteristics.

[Table 2 about here]

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The decision to enter into a restrictive or adaptive MLA is based on the
comparative advantages of contracting. The proposition is tested using a logistic model,
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 for an MLA associated with an adaptive
arrangement; and 0 otherwise. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics. In Table 4 the
overall model is statistically significant, Chi-square (9) = 114.48, p < .00. The model
correctly predicts about 77.01 percent of the cases. Diagnostics performed to detect
multicollinearity above 0.8 suggest no serious problem.

[Table 3 about here]

[Table 4 about here]

The transaction costs perspective suggest that governments will enter into an
adaptive arrangement for difficult to measure and highly asset specificity services.
Local governments would prefer to enter into a restrictive arrangement when a
transaction involves goods and services that are relatively low on both asset specificity
and service measurability problems. Table 4 reports that local governments are more
likely to enter into an adaptive, rather than restrictive, contracts when goods and services
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have high rather than low asset specificity and measurability problems, β =4.65, p < .00.
Specifically, on average, an MLA is more likely to be in an adaptive rather than
restrictive arrangement by a factor of 104 times when the characteristic of goods and
services has high rather than low asset specificity and service measurability problems,
holding the other independent variables constant.
Within the context of public safety, when public officials are faced with multiple
tasks requiring specialized knowledge and their efforts to accomplish those tasks are
difficult to determine in advance, they tend to opt for an adaptive arrangement. A similar
conclusion can be reached with goods and services that have low asset specificity but
high service measurability problems. Here, we can expect an MLA with an adaptive
rather than a restrictive arrangement to be more likely established by local governments,

β =3.57, p < .00. In an adaptive arrangement, local governments can integrate multiple
organizational preferences and expertise in the provision of public safety activities such
as standard procedure and joint technical assistance without having to craft a legally
binding agreement.
A local government’s decision to enter into an MLA is also influenced by the
number of potential signatories because size determines the costs of negotiating,
maintaining, and enforcing an arrangement. As the number of signatories gets larger, the
greater the organization costs involved, and the easier it is for localities to free ride on the
efforts of others. Theoretically, individual localities may not contribute fully to the efforts
of the collective since the proportion of the shared benefits to a single locality decreases
as the group size gets larger. Moreover, lack of openness makes it difficult to identify
who should contribute most to solving complex regional problems. Our results show that,

22

as the number of signatory increases, a flexible or adaptive arrangement will be preferred,

β =0.11, p < .00. Local governments can avoid a joint-decision trap in the presence of
uncertainty when they can craft an MLA with an adaptive arrangement since the
fulfillment of the arrangement is generally nonobligatory, reciprocal, and yet easily
terminated without significant legal consequences compared to a restrictive arrangement.
However, the extent to which an adaptive arrangement is feasible depends on the
pre-existing relationships of signatories. Given the geographical proximity of local
governments, pre-existing relationships may not be an immediate issue, but local politics
often complicates future policy preferences and thus may affect the motivation for
cooperation. We employed two variables as proxies for interjurisdictional relations: the
number of municipalities located within a county political boundary and the functional
categories of service providers (i.e., police, fire, EMS, or any combination of providers).
We assume adaptive MLAs can provide opportunities for mutual assurances if each
signatory will contribute to the provision of the collective goods. Bearing this in mind,
we can expect the number of jurisdictions within a political boundary to have a positive
effect on the type of MLAs. Our results show that, on average, as the number of
municipalities within a county increases by one unit (ranges from 1 to 38 units), we can
expect the likelihood of adopting an adaptive rather than a restrictive arrangement to
increase by a factor of 1.03 times, holding the other variables constant, β =0.03, p < .07.
As for the functional categories of service providers, an agreement in the
company of similar functional agency, an adaptive arrangement is more likely than
restrictive arrangement when compared to an agreement involving multiple specialized
agencies. This is because agencies having similar concerns and policy goals can reduce
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the transaction costs of negotiating an agreement. The variable is treated as a nominal
category where the involvement of multiple specialized agencies is regarded as the
benchmark. The result shows that when compared to an MLA that is made up of several
specialized agencies, an MLA for police departments is more likely to be based on a
restrictive rather than an adaptive arrangement, β = -1.00, p < .00. The usage of a
restrictive contract such as an interlocal service agreement, leases, or contracts, reflects
how the presence of local politics can influence the type of arrangement used to govern a
contract. On the other hand, when compared to an MLA involving several specialized
agencies, an MLA entered into by EMS or a fire department tends to be based on flexible
contracting. The differences are not statistically significant, however.

CONCLUSION
Why do local governments enter into a particular type of MLA? In addition to
economic and legal reasons, theoretically, local governments enter into MLAs for
strategic reasons. Depending on the characteristics of goods and services, the nature of
interjurisdictional relations, and the number of signatories involved, local governments
can minimize the transaction costs of contracting based upon the governance structure
established by the agreements.
Empirically, our results provide strong statistical evidence that the number of
signatories influences the decisions of local government i.e., on the type of MLAs. This
finding is by no means obvious, for the transaction costs literature is divided on what
types of agreements local governments would enter into given a particular number of
potential signatories (Pisano 1989; Gulati 1995; Oxley 1997; Gulati & Singh 1998). One
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explanation emphasizes the tendency to establish restrictive arrangements to control
opportunistic behavior since a large number of signatories would suggest higher
monitoring costs; while another explanation calls attention to the importance of
associational or group norms which could bring about informal sanctions to curb
opportunistic behavior.
The nature of goods and services also influences the type of arrangements, and
these arrangements are not confined to contractual decisions with organizations in the
private or nonprofit sector (Brown & Potoski 2003). By showing the extent to which
local governments’ decisions might be influenced by the characteristic of goods and
services, this article’s results speak to the enduring paradox of local government’s
participation in MLAs while highlighting the difficulty in maintaining adaptive contracts
because of intergovernmental relations (Ferris & Graddy 1986; Hirlinger & Morgan
1991; Stein 1990; Post 2004). This finding is by far the most cited reason why local
governments might establish agreements with another government rather than
organizations in the private or nonprofit sector.
However, there are several limitations in our findings. An underreporting of
agreements in public safety activities by local governments is highly probable. This is
largely because most local governments do not keep a central file on all written and
unwritten agreements. Furthermore, because most MLAs are based on self-reporting
made by large counties in Florida, information on public safety agreements may reflect
activities between municipalities and county governments. There is no obvious way
around these shortcomings since no other systematic gathering of agreement-specific
information is currently available at the state level. Nevertheless, this study makes several
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contributions. Unlike prior studies, which largely used cross-sectional survey data and
case studies to capture local officials’ perceptions of cooperation, our analysis takes on
the characteristics of the agreements. It provides insights on how different types of
agreements may produce different incentives structures for local governments to enter
into MLAs.
Of course, all things are not equal. Future research should explore the importance
of the state statutory framework. Local governments’ decisions are often influenced by
the state statutory framework and local political institutions, which may be specific in
articulating the administrative procedure for forming agreements (Carr 2004). As
documented by Atkins (1997): Local government efforts to consolidate ambulance and
fire services through interlocal service agreements may require public support as well as
union blessing; municipal governments providing assistance to the County Sheriff’s
Office through mutual aid agreements depend on the good faith of all parties; and the
joint efforts of special districts to initiate tax sharing activities may require local
ordinance and state legislature approval. Although in-house provision and production is
always an option, state and local institutions may specify the administrative process for
contracting out certain services and activities to other jurisdictions (Miller 1981).
Future research should examine the importance of associational benefits
generated by MLAs. For example, an MLA having adaptive characteristics generally
would require local governments to develop ongoing relationships with different
specialized agencies in order to accommodate and coordinate diverse policy preferences
(Thurmaier & Wood 2004; Lynn 2005). The need for ongoing relationships creates some
informal limits to how many MLAs can be entered into by localities. The more diverse
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the policy preferences, the more time and effort would be required to ensure deliberative
processes are made consensually. Although public safety activities are interrelated and
pre-existing relationships may not be an immediate issue, local politics often complicate
future policy preferences and affect the contractual choices made by local governments.
The problem becomes acute as multiple levels of government are involved.
Moreover, an MLA often leads various signatories to take on multiple roles. For
instance, when entering into MLAs, individual localities not only must improve their
capabilities and strategize responses to local concerns, they must also coordinate
activities with other localities. Since local governments’ concerns are rarely over a single
issue, they must allocate internal resources to spread risks, build local capacities, and
adjust their efforts in other areas. Consequently, activities in one functional area may
have implications for another area (Scholz & Feiock 2007). In short, MLAs, which
provide alternative governance structures for local governments to coordinate activities
across political boundaries, may have implications for other policy areas that not obvious
to policy makers.
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Table 1
Types of Agreement in Provision of Public Safety (Frequencies)
Type of Agreements
Interlocal Service Agreement

Frequency
163

Percentage
41.8

Mutual Aid Agreement*

165

42.3

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
Joint Planning Agreement

31

7.6

17

4.4

Contract/Lease Agreement

7

0.3

Informal/Letter of Agreement**

1

0.3

Others***
6
1.5
(i.e., Ordinance, Permit)
Total
390
100
Notes: * Statewide mutual aid agreements are excluded. Mutual aid agreement includes
operational assistant agreements
** Based on self-reporting and likely to be underestimated by local governments.
*** Some agreements are difficulty to classify given lack of description by reporting
counties. Data include specific ordinance and permits.
Source: Author’s data coding. Taken from various interlocal service delivery reports by 32 major
counties, Florida’s Department of Community Affairs (2003).

Table 2
Characterization of Public Safety Service Categories
Low Service
Measurability

High Service
Measurability
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Low Asset Specificity
Licensing equipment/ software
Billing and financial transfers
Vehicle fleet maintenance

High Asset Specificity
Police/Fire/EMS communications
Educational/Training programs
Emergency medical services
Prisons/Jails

Planning/standard procedures
Technical studies/assistants
Operation of building/shelters

Fire protection/prevention
Law enforcement/police patrol
Mutual assistant/disaster relief
Crime prevention /investigation

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Variables
Adaptive Arrangement
Characteristics of Goods and Services:
Low Asset Specificity, Low Service Measurability
High Asset Specificity, Low Service Measurability
Low Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability
High Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability
Number of Signatories
Number of Cities in County
Functional Service Areas:
Combined Efforts
Police Services
Emergency Medical Services
Fire Services
Coastal Area

Standard
Deviation
0.45
0.49

Min

Max

0

1

0.13
0.12
0.17
0.59
6.56
12.98

0.33
0.32
0.37
0.49
4.37
10.41

0
0
0
0
3
1

1
1
1
1
20
38

0.30
0.49
0.03
0.17
0.58

0.46
0.50
0.16
0.37
0.49

0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1

No. of Observations = 261

Table 4
Logistic Regression on Adaptive Multilateral Agreements
Dependent Variable: Adaptive Arrangement
Constant
Characteristics of Goods and Services:
High Asset Specificity, Low Service Measurability
Low Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability
High Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability
Number of Signatories
Number of Cities in County
Functional Service Areas:
Police Services
Emergency Medical Services
Fire Services
Coastal Area

Coefficient
estimates
-4.44***

Standard
error
1.19

Odds
ratio
-

.17
3.57***
4.65***
.11**
.03*

1.53
1.13
1.07
0.04
0.01

1.18
35.52
104.58
1.12
1.03

-1.00***
1.26
0.39
-0.39

0.36
1.36
0.52
0.34

0.37
3.52
1.43
0.68

No. of Observations
261
LR Chi squared
114.48
Pseudo R-squared
0.31
Log Likelihood
-122.66
% Correctly Predicted
77.01
Note: Level of significance: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
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